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ESTIMATES OF THE OFFICER FORCE STRUCTURE REQUIRED TO MAN
THE PROJECTED NAVAL COMBATANT FORCES OF THE 19 80s AND 1990s.
E. V. ALDEN
Introduction
This study is part of the Requirements Models for Navy
Officer Billets portion of the proposed NPS research effort to
develop an integrated officer system planning model; the purpose
of this study was to conduct preliminary exploratory research to
provide a thinkpiece for policy makers which would provide in-
sight on the total problem of attempting to model the Naval officer
force structure as a system. This study considers the primary
first order factors which drive the requirements for officers to
man the combatant elements of the Navy; later effort in the
Requirements Models for Navy Officer Billets will attempt to
proceed from this study to consider the total operational forces
and consequently to model the requirements and workload measure-
ments necessary to determine Navy-wide requirements at the
organizational level.
The Navy policy maker is faced with a great deal of
uncertainty when he attempts to formulate manpower plans for the
Navy's future officer force structure. Many of these factors
are beyond his control; however, there are a few critical factors
over which he may exert considerable influence. It is the identi-
fication of some of these factors and their impact upon the com-
batant forces of the Navy of tomorrow and thus the required
officer force structure with which this thinkpiece is concerned;
as such, it was deemed appropriate to keep this paper at the
unclassified level.
This spring, in his testimony before Congress, Admiral
James L. Holloway, III, then Chief of Naval Operations, used
the following diagram to help explain part of the process involved























Figure 1. Force Structure Assessment of Naval Capabilities.*
possible exception of the "Navy Program Development" block of
Figure 1, the Navy manpower policy maker exerts very little
influence upon this process. Faced with this highly complex,
uncertain process, what can the manpower policy maker do?
Because of the long leadtime associated with Naval systems
and in spite of the uncertainty associated with trying to predict
the required future force structure the manpower policy maker
must develop rational plans for the future; he is forced to
*Source: U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services,
Hearings..., pt 2: Authorization Budget Priorities and Manage-
ment Issues, p. 1184, U.S. Govt. Print. Office, 1978.
develop plans and policies for systems which are being developed
now, but will be with us for the next 20 to 30 years. The key
question is how can we reduce the uncertainty (for we surely
cannot eliminate it) to make better plans for the future. We
cannot forecast the state of the national economy or the policy
(which drives the budget allocations) associated with a perceived
threat in the distant future. However, we can "forecast" at
least a portion of the systems and platforms which will compose
the future force structure. In addition, we can monitor current
technologies and possibly foresee "technological potentials"
which may impact the future. Finally, the manpower policymaker
can influence internal Navy policy which impacts the future
officer force structure.
Figure 2 is an attempt to simplify (admittedly a gross
oversimplification) our perspective of the process of deriving
officer requirements for the future force structure. One of the
major (if not the major) determinants of the future force struc-
ture is the current force structure; needless to say, the policy
maker has little influence over this "given" factor. The threat,
both current and evolving, is another factor over which he exerts
little influence. Two other factors which exert high impact upon
the future force structure are policy and technology; both of
these factors have a high degree of uncertainty associated with
them.
The remainder of this paper will examine these two areas
of uncertainty. The policy factor may be viewed as being composed



















































manpower policy maker exerts very little influence (e.g., national
policy reacting to a perceived threat) , and (2) internal Navy
policy over which he may exert a great amount of influence (e.g.,
ship officer manning standards. In the area of technology, we
will examine those emerging technologies which have a high poten-
tial to impact the future force in terms of weapons and platforms.
To screen our "technological potentials" we will use three ques-
tions to determine their relevance: (1) Does or can it make any
difference (to the force structure)?, (2) Are we willing to pay
the price (to bring the potential technology to fruition)?, and
(3) What is the possible impact upon the Naval officer force
structure? By highlighting these promising "technological poten-
tials" we can provide the decision maker an "alert flagged" set
of areas upon which to focus his consideration for future planning.
Projecting Combatant Force Levels
The structure of any large organization, including the
U.S. Navy, is (or should be) determined by the answer to the
strategic policy question—What business are we in? It is assumed
that the primary business or mission in which the Navy is engaged
is to help actualize national policy objectives through the appli-
cation of seapower. In order to provide a manageable scope for
this initial effort, an attempt was made to categorize the force
structure of the Navy by the degree of "centrality" (or how close)
each part of the forces are to this mission. Figure 3 is a depic-
tion of this categorization. It was concluded that those forces
in Category I composed of warships, other combatant ships, carrier
Shore/Support Organization/Force
IV. Support Craft Category
III. Combatant Craft Category
II Auxiliary Ships Category
I. Combatant Category
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Figure 3. Cateaorization of Naval Force Structure
air wings, and maritime patrol squadrons were most "central" and
would provide a manageable framework for this study effort. The
other force categories will be covered in the follow-on study
effort.
It was discovered that the errors associated with using
open literature and/or unclassified data sources to project
combatant force levels for the 1980s and 1990s were smaller than
the "errors" resulting from policy change resulting from a changed
perception of the threat from one political administration to the
next; therefore, only unclassified sources were used for this
initial study effort.
In order to determine the Naval force impact of the recent
emphasis by the Carter administration of NATO readiness, this
trend in the number of general purpose ships was projected as
depicted in Figure 4. The projected numbers of general purpose
ships in 1990 are depicted for both the last Ford administration
budget and for the FY79 Carter administration budget. The dif-
ference is a total of 90 ships (548 for Ford versus 458 for
Carter budgets) or a decrease of approximately 16% from one admin-
istration to the next. As we shall see, this change in national
policy will have a large impact upon the future Naval officer
force structure.
In order to obtain projections of the required officer
force structure to man the combatant category forces, OPNAV 121
forwarded representative Manpower Authorization Forms (OPNAV
1000/2 [Rev. 9-76]) to the Naval Postgraduate School.* The

















Projections of Numbers of General Purpose Ships
(excludes SSBNs) for Ford and Carter FY79 Budgets.
Sources: Pechman, Joseph A. (Editor), Setting National
Priorities - The 1978 Budget , The Brookings Institute, D.C.,
1978, p. 255, and Chief of Naval Operations, " Historical
Budget Data," booklet, CNO, March 1978, p. 10.
"representative types" which were used to estimate the officer
force structure are listed in Table 1. From this data Tables
2-5 were constructed to depict the required officer billets by
rank to man the various combatant platforms for the current (1978)
"Combatant Category" force structure; Table 6 is a summary table.
From these data a corresponding set of data for selected years
was constructed (see Tables 7 and 8) for the years 1978 , 1983,
and 1990. Table 9 and Figure 5 depict the projected officer
billets for the "Combatant Category" required to man the combat-
ant operational forces for the selected years.
The number of officer billets in the air community will
not change much by 1990 because the assumption is that there will
only be twelve carrier air wings and twenty-four land-based
maritime patrol squadrons (the 1990 Ford budget included 14 CAWs)
.
These data do not reflect the increasing number of aviators that
will be required on various "air capable" ships (e.g., LAMPS
detachments) nor the impact of possible national/Navy policy
decisions regarding the future status and nature of Naval aviation
(the V/STOL technology progress will have a definite impact upon
the resolution of this issue)
.
The submarine community will experience a slight overall
decrease in required officer billets as increases in attack
boats are offset by decreased numbers of ballistic missile boats
(both for the Ford and Carter projections)
.
*Note: The tabular data only include "authorized manpower" for























































List of Manpower Authorization Forms OPNAV 1000/2 (Rev. 9-76)
by "Representative Platform Types" used to Estimate the Required
Officer Force Structure Necessary to Man the "Combatant Category"
Platforms.
Manning Data for FFG-7 taken from article by CAPT John D. Beechei
USN, FFG-7 : The Concept and Design , U.S. Naval Institute Pro-




CAPT CDR LCDR LT LTJG ENS WO Total
CVN 1 18 25 44 19 16
I
22 145
CV 1 17 21 49 15 16 22 141
CGN 1 1 4 7 8 8 — 29
CG* 1 1 4 6 7 3 2 24
DDG - 1 2 3 4 7 2 19
DD - 1 1 4 7 5 - 18
FFG-1 - 1 1 4 5 4 1 16
FFG-7 - 1 1 5 3 1 - 11
FF - 1 1 4 4 6 - 16
SSN/SS - 1 2 3 5 1 - 12
SSBN-598 - 2 6 4 10 2 - 24
SSBN-727 - 2 8 12 6 28
Table 2.
Officer Billets by Warship Type and Rank (19 78).
*Data for cruiser flagships were not available; therefore,




% \ LT JG \ wo Total
LCC 1 2 6 10 6 8 8 41
LPD 1 1 1 7 5 5 4 24
LPH 1 3 9 8 8 5 10 44
LST - 1 1 3 2 4 1 12
LHA 1 4 10 14 8 10 5 52
LSD - 2 - 4 5 3 4 18
LKA 1 1 1 6 6 5 4 24
Patrol - - 1 3 2 - - 6
Mine Wfr - - 1 - 2 1 - 4
Table 3.





CDR LCDR LT LTJG ENS WO Total
Fighter: F-4/F-14 4 8 22 30 4 4 72
Lt Attack: A-7 4 8 8 20 - 2 42
Med Attack: A-6 2 4 8 20 2 1 37
Fixed Wing ASW:
S-3 2 6 17 20 1 1 47
Rotary Wing ASW:
SH-3 2 4 7 8 1 1 23
Reconnaissance
:
RA-5/RF-3 2 3 4 3 1 1 15
Electronic War-
fare: EA-6 4 9 35 9
- 2 59
Early Warning:
E-2 2 4 10 11
- 1 28
Tanker: KA-6* 2 4 8 20 2 1 37
Total 24 50 119 141 11 15 360
Total for 12
Active Wings 288 600 1428 1692 132 180 4320
Table A. Officer Billets by Rank for Squadrons
Composing a "Typical" Carrier Air Wing**
*NOTE: KA-6 manning assumed to be the same as A-6 squadron
manning
**SOURCE: The Navy's Multimission Carrier Airwing—Can the
of "typi- Mission be Accomplished with Fewer Resources? GAO
cal" air- Report to Congress, LCD-77-451, 16 Nov 1977. Billet






















Table 5. Officer Billets by Rank for 24 Active
Land-Based Maritime Patrol Squadrons.
(Assumes all squadron manning is the same as a
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CVN 4/ 580 4/ 580 5/ 725 4/ 580
CV 9/1,269 9/1,269 10/1,410 9/1,269
CGN 9/ 261 10/ 290 10/ 290 9/ 261
CG 19/ 456 20/ 480 19/ 456 18/ 432
DDG 37/ 703 39/ 741 39/ 741 36/ 684
DD 37/ 666 39/ 702 38/ 684 36/ 648
FFG-1 6/ 96 6/ 96 6/ 96 6/ 96
FFG-7 1/ 11 64/ 704 150/1,650 109/1,199
FF 58/ 928 20/ 320
Surface War-
ship Total 180/4,970 211/5,182 277/6,052 277/5,169
SSN 80/ 960 90/1,080 87/1,044 84/1,008
SSBN* 10/ 240 4/ 96
SSBN** 31/ 868 31/ 868 21/ 588 21/ 588
SSBN*** — 4/ 112 13/ 364 13/ 364
SSBN
Total 41/1,108 39/1,076 34/ 952 34/ 952
Total 301/7,038 340/7,338 398/8,048 345/7,129
Table 7.
Officer Billets by Various Warship Types Projected
for Selected Yearst
tProjected from Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings, Part 2,
p. 1426 and Brookings, p. 255 and p. 264.
*Polaris Note: All SSBNs have two crews; total number of SSBNs
**Poseidon based on a limit of 656 missiles.



















LCC 2/ 82 2/ 82 2/ 82 2/ 82
LPD 14/ 336 14/ 336 14/ 336 14/ 336
LPH 7/ 308 7/ 308 7/ 308 7/ 308
LST 20/ 240 20/ 240 20/ 240 20/ 240
LHA 4/ 208 4/ 208 4/ 208 4/ 208
LSD 13/ 234 13/ 234 13/ 234 10/ 180
LKA 5/ 120 5/ 120 5/ 120 3/ 72
Total
Amphibious 65/1,528 65/1,528 65/1,528 60/1,426
Patrol 4/ 18 6/ 36 16/ 96 10/ 60
Mine Warfare 3/ 12 4/ 24 11/ 44 7/ 28
Total 71/1,558 75/1,588 92/1,668 77/1,514
Table 8.
Officer Billets by Other Combatant Type Vessels
Projected for Selected Years.*
*Projected from Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings, Part 2,
p. 1427 and Brookings, p. 255.
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"^--~^^^ Year 1978 1983
1990
Billets
Platform Type"""" -^ Billets Billets Ford Carter
Aircraft
Carrier Air Wings 4,320 4,320 5,040 4,320
Maritime Patrol 1,608 1,608 1,608 1,608
Subtotal 5,928 5,928 6,648 5,928
Submarines
SSN/SS 960 1,080 1,044 1,008
SSBN 1,108 1,076 952 952
Subtotal 2,068 2,156 1,996 1,960
Surface Combatants
Warships 4,970 5,182 6,052 5,169
Other 1,558 1,588 1,668 1,514
Subtotal 6,528 6,770 7,720 6,683
TOTAL 14,524 14,854 16,364 14,571
Table 9.
Projected Officer Billets in Combatant Operational





























Trends in Projected Officer Billets by Warfare









Number of Officer Billets Required to Man Escorts for
Old (FF & FFG-1 to 6) and New (FFG-7) Manning
Standards Projected for Two Administration
Budgets.
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The surface community shows the greatest amount of change
due to national policy changes. There would have been an increase
of approximately 18% in officer billets from 1978 to 1990 had the
Ford administration policy held; however, under Carter adminis-
tration policy, the increase is only a little more than 3%, even
though the number of surface combatant platforms increase by
about 21% (from 251 in 1978 to 304 in 1990) — the cause of this
disparity is primarily a change in Navy policy rather than a
change in national policy!
Figure 6 graphically portrays the impact of the Navy's
change in manning policy for escort class vessels. The new man-
ning standards for the FFG-7 substitute enlisted men for officers
in some divisions, resulting in a change from a total of 16
officers to man the older escort vessels to a total of 11 for
the FFG-7 class (a decrease of about 31%) . Thus the policy of
"substitutability" will have a major impact upon the future
officer force structure on escort vessels. It should be noted
that this policy is one over which the manpower policy makers
should exercise a great deal of influence.
We have drawn attention in this section to the uncertainty
resulting from two types of policy changes: (1) National policy
changes resulting from the manner in which two different adminis-
trations view the threat (the changing nature of the threat could
well induce similar changes in the same administration) and (2)
a change in Navy policy which the manpower policy maker should
be able to influence. It should be noted before we examine the
impact of technology that for the purpose of modelling the officer
21
force structure even finer resolution of officer billet data
could be utilized; Table 10 depicts officer billets by major
designator category and rank for CV-64 (the SMDs and Form 1000/2s
give even greater detail)
.
Emerging Technologies Which May Impact the Force Structure
In his prepared statement to Congress this year, Admiral
James L. Holloway, III, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, said,
"There are several areas of technology where exploitation could
result in promising programs to improve Naval capabilities. In
each case, a significant research and development investment
will be necessary to promote those options to the level of full
scale development and subsequent production and operational
deployment,"*. The six areas of technology covered by Admiral
Holloway were: (1) Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing (V/STOL)
,
(2) Cruise Missiles, (3) Advanced Hull Forms, (4) Lasers, (5)
Satellite Systems, and (6) Computer Technology. In this section
we will briefly explore these emerging technologies screening
them for relevancy with our three critical criteria questions:
(1) Does or can it make a difference (to the force structure)?,
(2) Are we willing to pay the price (to bring the potential
technology to fruition)?, and (3) What is the possible impact
upon the Naval officer force structure?
The interaction of CNO's six emerging technologies with
each other and with the crucial Naval function of command, control
*U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings.
Part 2-Authorization Budget Priorities and Management Issues,
GPO, 1978, pp. 1247-1250.
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Designator^






111X 4 4 9 5 22
116X 3 3
130X 1 4 1 6
13 IX 7 5 13
S
25
132X 2 3 10
144X 1 1 1 3
i
152X 1 1 1 1 4
16XX 1 4 5
18XX 1 1
2 XXX 2 2 4 8
3XXX 1 1 2 3 7
4XXX 1 1 2
6XXX 2 10 4 5 21
7XXX 22 22
Total 1 17 21 49 15 16 22 141
Table 10.
Officer Billets by Major Designator and Rank for CV-54
(Constellation)
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communications, and intelligence (C 3 I) is depicted in Figure 7.
It is the author's opinion that three of the technologies
—
computers, satellites, and cruise missiles—will have the greatest
impact upon the future of Naval warfare and force structure;
consequently, we will discuss these areas first.
Computer Technology . The field of computer technology
has experienced an explosive rate of growth in the last decade;
this rate of growth is likely to continue in the future—causing
both opportunities and problems as one generation system replaces
another. The phenomenal data handling and information processing
capabilities of the computer places us on the verge of secure,
selective CI. This technological area probably will not directly
impact the force structure; however, in conjunction with other
technologies/systems it will enable a wider dispersal of forces
and a higher degree of centralization (command and control) . The
nation and the Navy appear willing at present to pay the price
of maturing this technology. In addition to the C^I application,
the miniaturization of computers impacts the guidance/control
functions of platforms (e.g., high speed surface ships, aircraft,
etc.) and weapons (e.g., cruise and guided missiles).
Satellite Systems . Satellite technology has opened a
whole new dimension of Naval warfare which we are just beginning
to tap. Satellites currently aid communications, navigation,
environmental reporting, surveillance and targeting. As satellite
systems and sensors become more refined, there will virtually be
"no place to hide" for surface vessels of any appreciable size.
24
Figure 7.
The Interaction of CNO's Six Emerging Technologies
and the C I Function.
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With increasing sophistication and reliability of the systems
linked with computers, the possibility of a near worldwide real-
time tactical C 3 I system will become a reality— if we are willing
to pay the price; all current indications would seem to point to
the fact that we are willing to pay the price to make these
systems operational (e.g., OSIS, FCC, TFCC, FLTSATCOM, etc.).
Cruise Missiles . The introduction of cruise missile
systems, such as HARPOON, has made a significant addition to the
fleet's offensive capability. When the TOMAHAWK becomes opera-
tional, the striking range of combatant forces will be greatly
increased. Remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) have been success-
fully coupled with precision guided munitions (PGMs).* These
innovations in weapon technology have ushered in the era of the
"Hitile"--where one weapon successfully launched equates to one
hit on the target! This is another technology for which we have
been willing to pay the price and is coming to fruition. These
weapon systems coupled with computer and satellite technologies
through a maturing C°I system may indeed revolutionize Naval war-
fare of the future as much as the introduction of the airplane
did in the 1930s and 1940s. If these technologies are brought
successfully to fruition, then one speculates on the impact on
the force structure; it portends a trend toward "lower value"
platforms (i.e., smaller, more mobile platforms manned by fewer
personnel, but with greater firepower)
.
*A U.S. Army Aquilla RPV successfully directed a Copperhead guided
projectile to a direct hit on a tank target during a recent
demonstration. (See Aviation Week & Space Technology, p. 11,
July 24, 1978.)
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Advanced Hull Forms . Several types of advanced hull
forms are in the early phases of R&D (e.g., hydrofoil, air
cushion vehicles [ACV]
,
planing craft, and small water plane
area twin hull [SWATH]). So far, however, we are a long way
from realizing Admiral Zumwalt's "100-knot Navy," perhaps
threat development of the three technologies discussed above
will force us to pay the price of developing and introducing
operational advanced hull form platforms. These systems would
tend to be much smaller, much more complex, and manned by fewer
personnel than current combatants. Due to the low state of
maturity of this technological area and the long leadtime neces-
sary for development and introduction of Naval platforms, we will
probably not see significant numbers of these platforms during
our period of interest (1980s and 1990s) —barring unforeseen
forces operating to change our projection of forces (e.g., only
10 combatant patrol vessels are currently projected for 1990




Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing Aircraft . At this
point in time, the question of the role of V/STOL aircraft in
Naval aviation is unresolved. The technology is immature and
seems to be plagued with problems--not the least of which is the
answer to the question of whether or not we (both from an admin-
istration/national and a Navy perspective) are willing to pay the
high price of bringing it to maturity. There are currently
several studies attempting to resolve this issue. CNO's estimates,
which may be deemed optimistic at this point in time due to
27
programming changes, of IOC for V/STOL aircraft were the early
to late 1990s.* Therefore, this technology, as with advanced
hull forms, is not likely to have a large impact on the force
structure during the period of interest—unless outside factors
intervene to force change , then the force structure of Naval
aviation could alter drastically.
Lasers . Current laser technology is most promising in
the areas of ranging, target designation and communication. We
are apparently still a long way from fielding a cost effective,
high power "death ray" weapon system. A policy decision has
been made to have DARPA retain cognizance over HEL system R&D.
Implications of These Emerging Technologies . We have
briefly explored (and attempted to highlight for the attention
of manpower policy makers) six emerging technologies which
potentially can affect the force structure of the Navy. If we
ignore the possibility of unforeseeable events such as technologi-
cal breakthrough or other operant factors which may force rapid,
revolutionary change, we can tentatively formulate some summary
implications regarding changes in the Naval force structure due
to these technologies. It should be emphasized that these trends
are merely the author's interpretations (opinions) of fuzzy
images obtained while attempting to read a very dim and cloudy
crystal ball.
*U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings...
Part 2-Authorization Budget Priorities and Management Issues,
GPO, 1978, pp. 1267-1271.
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Let us begin by considering four possibilities which
could compel change in the Naval force structure:
1. We are entering the era of the "Hitile."
2. We are on the threshold of an era in which there will
be "no place to hide" for large surface vessels.
3. We are approaching an age of near real time C^I.
4. We are in an era of increasing automation.
These factors will probably accelerate the move toward higher
numbers of "low value" platforms. With the increased possibili-
ties of automation presented by computer technology and the
necessity to automate many functions for which man's reaction
time is too slow, the Navy is able to consider new tradeoffs in
the operating/investment ratio (costs for manpower have been the
major factor in the past) . If the shift occurs to a high tech-
nology, capital intensive Navy of more platforms manned by fewer
personnel, then manpower planners are faced with new opportunities
and problems.
The role of the manpower planner as a policy maker will
increase in importance as he formulates alternative solutions to
the problems that will face us. One of the preeminent problems
suggested by this "new era" is that of the generalist versus the
specialist. The "Generalist versus Specialist Problem" will
raise a set of associated questions for which the manpower planner/
policy maker must find answers; some suggested representative
questions are:
Should we develop a "general specialist" for the new
platforms where fewer personnel must oversee more
functions?
29
What abilities are required under these new conditions?
What are the personnel quantity/quality availability
implications?
What are the grade/rank implications?
How do we retain these personnel (or indeed do we wish
to and for how long)
?
Each of these questions will in turn spawn a related set of
problems/questions/opportunities for the manpower planner/policy
maker; however, he needs to begin his deliberations early, if he
wishes to influence outcome in a positive manner. The findings
of the "HARDMAN" study* suggest that the optimum time is very
early in the development cycle.
Conclusions and Recommendations
As we have seen there are many factors which affect the
Naval manpower planning/policy making process over which the man-
power planner/policy maker exerts little or no influence. Some
of these factors are: Those due to external forces (e.g., the
nature of the threat, or national economic conditions, etc.);
Policy decisions of a national nature (e.g., the perception of
and reaction to an external threat by a political administration)
;
Current procurement programs which are "cast in concrete", and,
the existing force structure. The best thing that the manpower
planner/policy maker can do is to be aware of these factors and
to make them a part of his considerations as he formulates plans/
policy.
*Chief of Naval Operations, Military Manpower Versus Hardware
Procurement (HARDMAN) Report, CNO, October 1976.
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We have also considered factors over which the Naval
manpower planner/policy maker can exert influence. Among these
factors are the following: Future development/procurement pro-
grams—by advising on manpower issues early in the process; and
issues of internal Navy policy (e.g., "subtitutability" of enlisted
division heads versus officers on the FFG-7, recruitment and
training for a high technology Navy, and deliberate, rational
promotion of a "climate" for attitudes of professionalism,
careerism or occupationalism on the part of Navy personnel) --by
formulating and recommending alternatives which promote the best
interests of the Navy as a total system. It is recommended that
the Navy manpower planner/policy maker be aware of and monitor
technologies a£ they emerge in order to influence system develop-
ment efforts early in the cycle.
As the issues which affect the Navy become increasingly
complex, it is necessary to continue to refine and develop
methodology and tools such as the NARM and the NPS Integrated
Officer Planning Model to aid the manpower planner/policy maker.
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